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THE FEDERAL PAROLE DECISION AND THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION
Every day, the Federal Parole Board must decide whether to
parole prisoners whose records reveal a history of mental or emotional
disturbance and involvement in violent crime.' The Board's decision
to release such individuals sometimes has disastrous consequences. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Payton v.
United States,2 recently decided whether the Federal Tort Claims Act3
(FTCA) requires the federal government to pay for the consequences
of an improvidently granted parole.4 The Payton court, sitting en banc,
reversed a previous panel decision 5 and held that the decision to grant
parole fell within the "discretionary function" exception 6 of the FTCA.
This decision divests federal courts of jurisdiction to review a Federal
Parole Board decision even if it can be shown to be arbitrary or
capricious or to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Payton is the only decision that has addressed the question
whether the federal parole decision comes within the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.7 Since the parole decision in Payton,
I. The Parole Board's authorization to make parole decisions is embodied in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4206 (1982).
2. 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
4. The facts in Payton are as follows. In 1966, following a conviction arising from the brutal
beating of a servicewoman, for assault with intent to murder, Thomas Warren Whisenhant was
sentenced to 20 years in prison. In 1970, Whisenhant's sentence was reduced to 10 years, and in
1973 Whisenhant was released on parole. Within three years of his release, Whisenhant brutally
beat, murdered, and mutilated three women. Payton, 679 F.2d at 477-78. The Federal Parole
Board released Whisenhant within seven years of his initial incarceration, despite the fact that his
record revealed a long history of violent behavior. Whisenhant's record included an arrest when
he was in high school for purse snatching, a charge for the assault with intent to ravish a 14 year
old girl in 1963, the possible involvement in the murder of a 70 year old woman, the assault of the
servicewoman for which he was serving time, and a threat to kill a prison employee. Brief for
Appellants at xi, Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). In addition, Whisenhant's
unstable mental condition was well-documented. Prison psychiatrists had described Whisenhant
as "psychotic," and suffering from "schizophrenia and a paranoid type," and Whisenhant's
condition as "aggressive, chronic, severe, manifested by brutality and assaultive behavior." Id In
1968, two years before his sentence was cut in half, one prison psychiatrist stated that Whisenhant
was in "dire need of long term psychiatric treatment." Id He never received such treatment.
5. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
7. The discretionary function exception has been discussed extensively by commentators.
See, e.g., Harris & Schepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Revisited, 31 U.
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however, two important changes have taken place in the area of parole
decisions which arguably affect the applicability of Payton to present
parole decisions. First, the Parole Board implemented "Guidelines" 8
in 1973, which are intended to reduce unexplained disparities in the
granting of parole. Significantly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit panel, which held that the parole decision was not
a discretionary function, and therefore was subject to judicial review,
incorrectly assumed that the Parole Board had used the Guidelines to
make the parole decision in Payton.9 Second, Congress amended the
parole statute after Payton and deleted the word "discretion" from the
statute's reference to the Parole Board's decision-making function. 0
This note discusses the basis of the Payton court's holding that the
parole decision falls within the discretionary function exception. It
presumes that the parole decision, as it existed in Payton, was a
discretionary function, but examines whether the parole decision still
falls within that exception. The note first reviews the legislative history
and the courts' historical treatment of the discretionary function
exception.' The note then analyzes the reasoning behind the en banc
and panel opinions in light of this history.' 2 The note concludes that
the parole decision is still a discretionary function, although for reasons
other than those advanced by the en banc court.' 3
I. THE HISTORY OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The FTCA provides that the federal courts have jurisdiction over
claims against the United States for the negligent acts or omissions of
its employees.' 4 Before Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
in 1946,15 the only means of obtaining redress for the tortious actions of
MIAMI L. REv. 161 (1976); Developments in the Law-Remedies 4gainst the United States and its
Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 892 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]; Note,
The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 ALB. L. REV. 721 (1978);
Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 67
GEo. LJ. 879 (1979). In addition, the issue of whether parole board members are immune from
review under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), has been heavily litigated. Courts
uniformly agree that parole board members enjoy some immunity from suit, although they
disagree on the extent of that immunity. See infra note 42.
8. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20-.21 (1983).
9. Payton, 636 F.2d at 139-43.
10. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970) with 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1982).
11. See infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 41-87 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 53-87 and accompanying text.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
15. The Federal Tort Claims Act was finally incorporated into Title IV of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1976)), 30 years after incorporation was initially proposed.
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government employees was relief granted through a private bill passed
by Congress.16 Although the FTCA's grant of jurisdiction is broad, it is
not without exceptions. Among the exceptions is section 2680(a), the
"discretionary function" exception, which provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to - (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government ... based upon the exercise of per-
formance or failure to perform a discretionary function . .. whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.17
The legislative history of the discretionary function exception, and the
case law interpreting it, clarify the scope of this exception.
A. The Legislative History of the Discretionary Function Exception.
The legislative history of the discretionary function exception is
sparse. Congress held no hearings relevant to the discretionary func-
tion exception in the year prior to adoption of the FTCA,18 but did
conduct hearings four years earlier on a proposed bill identical to the
one eventually passed.19 These hearings illuminate the underlying le-
gal history and the broad parameters of the exception.
The discretionary function exception had its origins in English
common law, which granted immunity to officials performing judicial
or quasi-judicial tasks.20 The historical reasons for granting such offi-
cials immunity from judicial review were to avoid "stultifying" admin-
istrative decisions, to aid the efficiency of such decisions, and to avoid
judicial scrutiny of essentially legislative functions.2' Testimony before
Congress indicated that even if the discretionary function exception
had not been included in the Act, courts would have refrained from
reviewing such official actions because of their long history of doing
SO.2
2
16. Indeed, the volume of bills before Congress was the primary impetus for the passage of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. In the two years prior to the passage of the Act, over 2000 claims
were introduced before Congress with over 1000 receiving approval. Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
18. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 (1953).
19. Tort Claims.- Hearings on H.R 5373 andH.AR 6463 before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
20. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 n.30 (1953) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 131 (1940); Louisiana
v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633 (1914); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); see also Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 7, at 892.
21. Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 892.
22. Hearings, supra note 19, at 29 (Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea);
see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953) (recognizing the principle embodied in
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The purpose of the discretionary function exception was to com-
pensate persons injured by the ordinary common law torts of govern-
ment employees-such as the negligent operation of a motor vehicle23
-while barring the courts from reviewing so-called "discretionary" ac-
tivities. Congress gave as an example of discretionary activity the exer-
cise of authority by an official of the Federal Trade Commission or the
Securities and Exchange Commission.24 Congress left it to the courts
to determine which official actions falling between these two extremes
come within the ambit of the discretionary function exception.
B. Judicial Treatment of the Discretionary Function Exception.
The first major decision in which the Supreme Court interpreted
the discretionary function exception was Dalehite v. United States,25 In
Dalehite, citizens of Texas City, Texas sued the government for negli-
gently manufacturing and transporting fertilizer that exploded and lev-
elled the entire city. The Court held that the government's actions fell
within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA26 because the
decisions were made at the planning level rather than the operational
level.27 The Court found that the key factor which distinguished a
planning level decision from an operational decision was the presence
of policy considerations; the Court stated that "where there is room for
policy judgment and decision, there is room for discretion. '28
Later courts that relied on the "planning-operational" distinction
as the basis for applying the discretionary function exception did little
to develop a set of factors to determine when government officials are
the discretionary function exception as a "concept of substantial historic ancestry in American
Law").
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942); S. REp. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942).
25. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
26. Id at 33.
27. Id at 42.
28. Id at 36. The Court also held that "acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of
government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable." Id It was necessary to
protect these activities from review to prevent litigants from side-stepping the exception by simply
suing the government for the ministerial execution of planning level decisions. The same princi-
ple is found in Civil Rights Act litigation where the acts of public officials pursuant to judicial
directive are granted immunity from suit. Such immunity is called "derivative immunity" because
the official's immunity is derived from the judicial immunity of the judge. McCray v. Maryland,
456 F.2d 1, 5 n.1 1(4th Cir. 1972); see Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 941 (1969).
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making a planning level decision, which is immune from review.2 9 The
court in Swanson v. United States30 made perhaps the best attempt to
clarify the planning-operational distinction when it stated:
In a strict sense, every action of a government employee, except
perhaps a conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some degree
of discretion. The planning level notion refers to decisions involving
questions of policy, that is, the evaluating of factors such as the
financial, political, economic and social effects of a given plan or
policy.31
Beginning in the 1960's, the courts rejected the planning-opera-
tional distinction as being either too conclusory32 or as focusing too
narrowly on the level of the government official who made the deci-
sion33 and began instead to concentrate their focus on the "nature and
quality" of the disputed actions themselves.34 Although the factors ex-
29. See, e.g., Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956) (government liable for
damage caused when government pilots flew too low to the ground, because flying planes close to
the ground was not necessary to the completion of the project, but was result of carelessness);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73-78 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (government liable
for negligent instructions of air traffic controllers which caused planes to collide because, air traffic
controller's job does not entail considerations important to the practicability of the government's
program of controlling air traffic).
30. 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964). In Swanson, the court held that the discretionary
function exception did not cover the negligent modification of an elevator mechanism in an air-
plane where such modification was not part of the agency decision to develop fail-safe
modifications.
31. Id at 219-20 (emphasis added). Other cases have emphasized that in order to find that a
discretionary function exists, more than mere choice must be exercised by a government official.
Instead, the discretionary function exception encompasses choices which entail a consideration of
variouspolicy factors. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974);
Mayer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 594-98 (5th Cir. 1973); J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 515 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.)
("Most conscious acts of any person ... involve choice. Unless government officials. . . make
their choices by flipping coins, their acts involve discretion."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
32. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
33. See Comment, supra note 7, and cases cited therein. This commentator criticizes the
"planning-operation" approach as including too much within the discretionary function exception
and the "good samaritan" approach, see infra note 34, as including too little.
34. Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Dalehite, and before the "nature and quali-
ty" cases, a line of cases labelled the "good samaritan" cases was decided. The "good samaritan"
cases hold that once a government project is undertaken the government is liable for any damage
caused by negligent action in the undertaking. See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315 (1957); Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955); Somerset Seafood Co. v.
United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951). These cases have been interpreted as cutting back
the Dalehile Court's interpretation of the scope of the discretionary function exception, and the
Court's holding that the execution of planning level decisions is protected from review by the
discretionary function exception. See, e.g., J. H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d
97, 99 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting an "absolutist interpretation" of Dalehite); Smith v. United States,
375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
Although the "good samaritan" cases may at first blush appear to restrict the Dalehite deci-
sion, an examination of the cases reveals that they leave Dalehile intact. Although the Dalehite
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amined by the courts vary depending on the factual situation, the "na-
ture and quality" test is simply a reaffirmation of the Dalehite Court's
characterization of discretionary functions as decisions that require the
balancing of various policy factors.
Two recent cases illustrate the courts' current approach to the dis-
cretionary function exception. In Gray v. United States,35 the court
held that a Food and Drug Administration decision to release a drug
without an accompanying warning was a discretionary function be-
cause of the policy considerations to be weighed-the risk of release
against the benefits of use36-and because the exercise of such judg-
ment had not been removed by the presence in the authorizing statute
or regulations of a "scientific test or measuring stick" by which a deci-
sion could be mechanically produced.37 Similarly, in Smith v. United
Court held that the execution of planning level decisions, "in accordance with official directions,"
is immune from review, even though those actions might be conducted exclusively at the opera-
tional level, it did not hold that the negligent execution of such decisions is immune from review
when such activities are conducted exclusively at the operational level. For instance, it has not
been asserted that Dalehite meant to protect from review the negligent operation of a motor vehi-
cle even though a government employee might be driving that vehicle as part of a planning level
decision.
Furthermore, none of the "good samaritan" cases hold that the negligent execution of plan-
ning level decisions, which itself involves planning level decisions, is actionable. Although the
activities found to be actionable in the "good samaritan" cases involved the execution of planning
level decisions, none of these executions contained actual planning level decisions. See, e.g.,
Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1958) (negligent failure of government firefighters to
extinguish fire held actionable); Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (failure to
properly maintain a lighthouse including failure to check the electrical system, properly examine
connections, repair lights and give notice to passing vessels that lights were not functioning held
actionable); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951) (failure to prop-
erly mark sunken ship was actionable although the initial decision to mark sunken ships was held
to be a discretionary function). Indeed, many courts compared the activities under review to the
negligent operation of an automobile, the very type of common law tort the FTCA was intended
to encompass. See, e.g., Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 1956); Eastern Air
Lines v. United Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Thus, even if the present parole
decision is found to be an execution of a planning level decision, if the execution itself requires
planning level decisions or if it is conducted strictly in accordance with official directions, it is
immune from review under both Dalehite and the "good samaritan" line of cases.
35. 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
36. Id at 340-41. This type of decision should be contrasted to decisions that, although in-
volving the weighing of several conflicting factors, do not involve the weighing of conflictingpol-
icy factors. The Gray court gave as an example of such a decision Griffin v. United States, 500
F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). In Griffin the plaintiffsued the government for releasing a vaccine from
which she contracted polio. The court held that the decision to release was not a discretionary
function because the government only had to weigh five criteria to determine whether specific
neurovirulence standards had been met. This was a purely scientific judgment which could be
scrutinized under standards applied to professional negligence. Id at 1067-69.
37. 445 F. Supp. at 340. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 376 (10th
Cir. 1977) (government performing a discretionary function when labelling fertilizers with warn-
ings because the only direction given by the authorizing statutes was that warnings be "adequate
for the protection of the public"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1978) with Duncan v. United States,
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States,38 the court held that the decision to prosecute was a discretion-
ary function because that decision involved the weighing of policy fac-
tors-the rights of the accused against the welfare of society 39-and,
harking back to the origins of the discretionary function exception, be-
cause the decision was quasi-judicial in nature in that it involved a
government official legally binding one or many persons in a way no
private individual could.4°
II. THE DECISIONS IN PAYTON V UNITED STATES
The court of appeals panel in Payton held that the parole decision
was not a discretionary function. A major distinction between the en
banc opinion and the panel opinion is that the panel opinion incor-
rectly assumed that the parole board used the 1973 Guidelines when
making the parole decision in Payton.41 Despite this mistake, the panel
decision is valuable because it is the only judicial decision to date to
examine the parole decision as it now functions under the 1973
Guidelines.
The court of appeals panel relied heavily on interpretation of the
parole statute to arrive at its conclusion. The parole statute in force at
the time the parole decision in Payton was made provided:
If it appears to the Board of Parole ... that there is a reasonable
probability that such a prisoner will live and remain at liberty with-
out violating the law, and if in the opinion of the Board such release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board, may, in its
355 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D.D.C. 1973) (refusal to certify pilot for duty was actionable because
decision to certify involved nothing more than application of specific facts to an existing rule) and
Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 782-83 (2d Cir. 1969) (negligent determination that a
seaman was unfit for sea duty was actionable because determination involved nothing more than
the application of specific facts to an existing rule).
38. 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
39. Specifically, the court noted that a prosecutor must consider "the likelihood of convic-
tion, . . the degree of criminality, the weight of evidence,. . . precedent, policy, the climate of
public opinion, timing, and the relative gravity of the offense." Smith, 375 F.2d at 247 (emphasis
added) (citing Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)); see also Kiiskila v. United
States, 466 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1972) (decision to discharge employee from a United States
military post was a discretionary function because it was analogous to the decision whether to
prosecute in that it involved considerations of security, discipline, and morale).
40. Smith, 375 F.2d at 248. The court cautioned against shifting control of such decision-
making from the hands of officials, to the hands of individuals through private damage suits, a
result that would be contrary to the purpose of the FTCA to spread the monetary loss of injury,
not to distribute political responsibility to private individuals.
41. Whisenhant was granted parole on November 28, 1973. Petition for Panel Rehearing at
3-5, Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). The Guidelines were first tested region-
ally in 1972, 38 Fed. Reg. 26,652-57 (1973), and were not adopted nationwide until November 19,
1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973), well after Whisenhant's parole was processed. The Guidelines
are presently codified, in slightly different form, at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1983).
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discretion, authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.42
42. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970) (emphasis added). The regulations accompanying this statute
provided that
the granting of parole rests in the discretion of the Board of Parole. The Board may
parole a prisoner who is otherwise eligible if (a) he has observed substantially the rules
of the institution in which he is confined; (b) there is a reasonable probability that he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the laws; and (c) in the opinion of the Board
such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
28 C.F.R. § 2.2 (1973). Other than this authorization there were no formally articulated criteria or
policies to guide the parole decisions. One court in reviewing a prisoner's complaint brought
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), for denial of parole noted that a number of
factors might be taken into account when making a parole decision, such as the length and seri-
ousness of the prisoner's prior criminal record, his family history, and his marital situation, but
emphasized that the weight accorded to any of these factors was completely within the discretion
of the board. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.) (en bane), acated
as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
Although all cases brought under the Civil Rights Act grant Parole Board decisions immu-
nity, courts disagree about the extent of the immunity. Cases granting Parole Board decisions
absolute immunity (not subject to review even if arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion)
include: Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 402 (1981);
Buchanan v. Clark, 441 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1971); Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949) (the parole
function "bristl[es]" with discretion); Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340, 1345
(E.D. Mich. 1975). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, appears to
be retreating from the position that parole board members enjoy absolute immunity. A number of
recent cases have held that parole decisions enjoy only qualified immunity--they are not subject
to review if merely negligent, but they are reviewable if arbitrary, capricious, or constituting an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1979); Brown v.
Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1054 (5th Cir. 1976); Calabro v. United States Bd. of Parole, 525 F.2d
660, 661 (5th Cir. 1975); Thompkins v. United States Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir.
1970). These courts, however, cited as support for their decisions the cases cited above that have
found the parole decision to be absolutely immune from review. In addition to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, several other courts, construing the Civil Rights Act or a similar
state statute, have held that parole boards and parole officials enjoy only qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Fitzgerald v. Procunier, 393 F. Supp. 335, 343 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Joyce v. Gilligan, 383 F.
Supp. 1028, 1031 (N.D. Ohio 1974), af'd, 510 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1975); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
Pardons and Parole, 115 Ariz. 260, 265, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1972).
The basis for the disagreement as to the extent of immunity to be accorded parole officials
under the Civil Rights Act appears to stem from the application of common law judicial and
quasi-judicial immunity to various tasks performed by government officials. Unlike the FTCA,
the Civil Rights Act did not explicitly exempt "discretionary" activities from review. The Civil
Rights Act, however, was not intended to override the common law doctrine ofjudicial and quasi-
judicial immunity. See, e.g., McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972). Thus, the deci-
sions of judges cannot be attacked under the Civil Rights Act. The courts that have granted
parole officials absolute immunity from judicial review have relied on Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978), for support. In Butz the Court examined the functional similarity between the
activity of a judge and an administrative official to determine whether the latter should enjoy
absolute immunity from review. The court in Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303, and Bricker, 405 F. Supp.
at 1345, employed the Butz analysis and concluded that parole board members should be ac-
corded absolute immunity because the decision made by a parole board was sufficiently similar to
decisions made by judges. Most courts holding that parole board members enjoy only partial
immunity have not been explicit about the basis for their position. Presumably, they believe that,
although the parole decision entails the use of some amount of discretion, it is too dissimilar in
function to that ofjudges to accord it absolute immunity. The court in Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
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Examining this statute, the court of appeals panel held that the
"discretion" of the parole board was not absolute, but bounded by the
limitations that there be a "reasonable probability that such prisoner
will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws" and that
"such a release . . .not [be] incompatible with the welfare of soci-
ety."43 The court of appeals panel in Payton also found that the parole
decision had become a largely "fixed and mechanicar' process since the
1973 Guidelines were instituted and, therefore, judicial review of pa-
role decisions would further the policies of the FTCA.44
In support of the panel's position, appellants before the en banc
court attempted to draw an analogy between the parole decision and
Pardons and Parole, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1972), however, was explicit. It found that the
role of a parole board member under Arizona law was not sufficiently similar to that of a judge to
justify absolute immunity. Id at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232. It found most significant the fact that
parole decisions, unlike judicial decisions, were not subject to appellate review. Id It should be
noted, however, that the present federal parole decision is subject to review by the National Ap-
peals Board. See infra note 56.
43. Payton, 636 F.2d at 139. Specifically, the panel court read the statute to mean that if the
initial request, submitted by either the prisoner or the prison bureaucracy, showed that the pris-
oner was a "good risk," then the decision of the parole board was not reviewable. Id
44. Id at 146; see infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. The court balked at the idea that
if the parole decision fell within the discretionary function exception, the parole board could re-
lease Whisenhant even if it knew he would "go on such a hideous rampage" and still be protected
from review because the discretionary function exception protects even "abuse[s] of discretion."
Payton, 636 F.2d at 146. The court contended that this could not be true, both because of the
limitations on the board's function set forth in the parole statute, and because the Supreme Court,
in Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), allowed recovery against government officials
who knowingly violated statutes under which they were authorized to act. Payton, 636 F.2d at
146. First, it should be noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the parole board had abused its
discretion, although a finding that the parole decision was a discretionary function would protect
such an abuse. Second, the court's use of Hatahley v. United States is inappropriate. The
Hatahley decision held the government liable for taking horses from their owners because the
government failed to give notice to the owners under a statute which required that before horses
were removed, the owners must be given written notice. 351 U.S. at 178-80. This did not amount
to an abuse of discretion because the giving of notice was a completely ministerial function not
involving any discretion. Id at 181.
The question remains, however, whether the parole board members' decision would be pro-
tected from review even if they knew Whisenhant would kill three women after his release. What
constitutes an "abuse of discretion" has been debated in the area of judicial review of administra-
tive decisions. Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act protects from review activi-
ties "committed to agency discretion by law." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701
(1982). Two positions exist as to the scope of this protection. One position interprets this provi-
sion as protecting all decisions made by administrative officials empowered to make decisions that
involve discretion. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16, at 80 (1958). A more
recent position interprets this provision as protecting only those decisions in which discretion is
exercised. In other words, the parole board would not be protected if it made its decision to release
Whisenhant by flipping coins. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
359 (1965). It would appear, under both of these positions, however, that if the parole board went
through some decisionmaking process it would be immune from review.
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"negligent release" cases.45 In one such case, Fair v. United Stales,4 6 a
mentally disturbed Air Force officer who threatened to kill a woman
was released from a military hosptial despite the fact that Air Force
physicians knew of such threats. The patient subsequently killed the
woman and her bodyguards. The government argued that the physi-
cian's decision to release the patient came within the discretionary
function exception. In rejecting this argument the Fair court held that
although the initial decision to treat the patient was discretionary, any
negligent treatment thereafter, including the decision to release, was
actionable.47
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered a
rehearing en banc and reversed the panel decision in Payton. The en
banc court held that the parole decision was a discretionary function
and, therefore, was not subject to judicial review. The en banc court
considered neither the effect of the 1973 Guidelines on parole decision-
making48 nor Congress's subsequent amendment of the parole
statute.49
The en banc court initially reviewed the history of the discretion-
ary function exception; its decision, however, rested exclusively on its
interpretation of the parole statute.50 It rejected the panel's interpreta-
tion of the statute as placing limitations on the parole board's discre-
tion and held that the statute described the decision as wholly within
the discretion of the parole board.51 The court also rejected appellants'
attempt to analogize the "negligent release" cases to the parole deci-
sion. In doing so, the court once again relied on the wording of the
parole statute. The court stated that the Fair case was nothing more
than a case of medical malpractice, "in no way analogous to the parole
board, acting within the discretion granted by statute, deciding to re-
lease a prisoner on parole. '5 2
45. Supplemental Brief of Appellants for Rehearing En Banc at 35, Payton v. United States,
636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
47. Id at 294, 296.
48. See supra note 41.
49. Whisenhant was paroled in 1973. The present parole statute was enacted in 1976.
50. Payton, 679 F.2d at 480. The court stated: "The question thus becomes whether the
decision by the parole board was a discretionary act. We need go no further than the statute in
order to make this determination." Id
51. The court gave no reason for disagreeing with the panel's interpretation other than stat-
ing: "[the panel's interpretation] is not, however, what the statute says." Id
52. Payton, 679 F.2d at 481; see also infra note 78. Finally, the court dismissed appellants
attempt to analogize Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966), to the facts of
Payton. Underwood also involved the negligent release of a mental patient from a federal hospi-
tal. The action that was under attack, however, involved no weighing of policy factors. Rather,
the physician had failed to provide his replacement with vital information about the patient's
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PA4YTON DECISION
The en banc decision is not today, nor was it at the time it was
written, a sufficient response to the arguments put forth by the court of
appeals panel. The attempts by both the panel and the en banc court to
construe the parole statute in order to determine whether a parole deci-
sion is a discretionary function are unsatisfactory. The wording of the
parole statute is clearly ambiguous.53 Yet, apparently neither the panel
nor the en banc court made any attempt to resort to the legislative his-
tory for assistance. Moreover, the en banc court's complete reliance on
the parole statute, particularly on the statute's description of the parole
decision as "discretionary," is of little assistance in determining
whether the current parole decision is a discretionary function because
Congress has deleted the word "discretion" from the text of the present
parole statute. Most important, however, the en banc court's complete
reliance on the wording of the parole statute is misplaced because the
judicial treatment of the discretionary function exception 54 makes it
clear that the exercise of "discretion," by itself, will not protect a deci-
sion from judicial review. To be immune from review, a decision must
entail a particular type of discretion: a quasi-judicial type of discretion
that involves the weighing of policy factors.55
In order to determine whether the parole decision entails consider-
ations of such policy factors, the courts should examine the parole deci-
sion in the context of the parole statute as a whole, the legislative
history of the parole statute, and the procedure attendant to the parole
decision.
The present parole statute provides:
If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the in-
stitution.., and.., upon consideration of the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
prisoner [the Parole Board] determines ... that release would not
depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the
law [and] that release would not jeopardize the public welfare...
such prisoner shall be released.56
mental condition. It was this failure and not the decision to release that the court found review-
able because of its completely "operational" nature. Payton, 679 F.2d at 481.
53. Another court, construing a state parole statute very similar to the federal parole statute
found, as did the panel court, that the board's discretion was bounded by judgmental limitations.
Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1972). But see Joyce
v. Gilligan, 383 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 & n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (court held that a similar parole
statute gave parole board members immunity from review), aj'd, 510 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1975).
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 25-40.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1982). The new parole statute was part of the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219, 219-31 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
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A quick comparison of the present parole statute and the statute
under review in Payton57 demonstrates that the statute's description of
the parole decision has not changed dramatically. The amount and
type of "discretion" exercised by the Parole Board, however, remain
unclear from a reading of the statute alone. This ambiguity is height-
ened by the fact that Congress deleted the word "discretion" from the
text of the statute. Although this deletion should not be dispositive, it
may indicate Congress's view on the type or breadth of discretion that
the Parole Board exercises, particularly because Congress enacted the
parole statute after it implemented the Guidelines, which Congress de-
scribed as "structuring" the discretion of the Parole Board.5 8
The legislative history of the parole statute reveals that Congress
did not intend the deletion of the word "discretion" from the statute to
be significant. The legislative history states in several places that the
parole decision remains a highly discretionary function.5 9 Further-
more, the discretion to be exercised involves the weighing of various
§§ 4201-4218 (1982)). The purpose of the Act was to clarify the procedural steps involved in the
grant, denial and revocation of parole and to clarify the organizational structure of the parole
decision-making body. Prior to the Act, the Parole Board was part of the Department of Justice,
and had eight members who were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970). In 1976, the Board became a nine member independent agency.
This agency is now known as the United States Parole Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1982),
(The Commission will continue to be referred to in this note as the Parole Board for the sake of
simplicity). Prior to this structural change, all parole hearings and decisions were made by mem-
bers of the Board or an authorized hearing examiner. Project, Parole Release Decisionnaking and
the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 820 (1975). Under the present system, however, parole
hearings are conducted by two hearing examiners. Their recommendations are then forwarded to
regional commissioners who review their decisions. The National Appeals Board has final au-
thority to review all parole decisions. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1982); see also S. REP. No. 369, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, 16-17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 335, 336, 338-39.
57. See supra text accompanying note 42.
58. S. REP. No. 369, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 18-19, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 335, 340.
59. S. REP. No. 369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 337 (the parole decision "remains a very subjective judgment"); H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 351-353 (the criteria for
parole decisions are "within the discretion of the agency"). Congress also stated that it affirmed
the existing case law concerning judicial review of individual cases. H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 353. The courts' positions on
judicial review are not uniform. This statement does indicate, however, that the 'deletion of the
word "discretion" was not intended to signal to the courts that the parole decisions were no longer
"discretionary" or that they should alter their views on whether such decisions were a discretion-
ary function under the FTCA. Furthermore, some parts of the Parole Commission and Reorgani-
zation Act make the discretionary nature of the parole decision more explicit. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 4218 (1982) provides that the parole decision shall not be subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act; rather the parole decisions fall within the exception to that Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982), which shields from review acts left to the "discretion" of an agency. In
addition, the Parole Board previously was required to consider all reports assembled by all serv-
ices active in a prisoner's case before making a parole decision. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1973). The
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policy considerations: the Board must consider financial and economic
factors (the expense of incarceration),60 social factors (the corrosive ef-
fect of continued incarceration on the prisoner's family and community
ties),6 ' and political factors (respect for the law and safety of the com-
munity).62 Congress stated explicitly that the weight to be accorded to
any of these factors was completely within the discretion of the
Board. 63
Moreover, Congress recognized that the parole function is quasi-
judicial in nature when it stated:
From an historical perspective, parole originated as a form of
clemency; to mitigate unusually harsh sentences, or to reward prisoninmates for their exemplary behavior while incarcerated. Parole to-
day, however, has taken a much broader goal in correctional policy,
fulfilling different specific objectives of the correctional system. Pa-
role is an extension of the hearing process.64
Thus, the parole decision as defined by the statute appears to
closely resemble those decisions traditionally found to come within the
discretionary function exception because the decision requires the bal-
ancing of numerous policy considerations and is quasi-judicial in na-
ture.65 Nevertheless, the parole decision is also bounded by the
recently amended parole statute provides that the Board need only consider information which is
available and which it considers relevant. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1982).
60. H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 351, 352.
61. H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 358-59.
62. H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 360.
63. H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 360. The legislative history cites in support of this statement Scarpa v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973), which held that the parole
decision was completely immune from review.
64. S. REP. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 335, 337 (emphasis added). Courts have also recognized the similarity between the sen-
tencing decision and the parole process. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. 1, 8 (1979) ("In parole releases, like its siblings, probation release and institutional rehabilita-
tion, few certainties exist. . . . In each case. . . the choice involves a synthesis of record facts
and personal observations filtered through the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judg-
ment."); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981) ([Plarole board offlicials perform
functionally comparable tasks to judges. The daily task of both. . . is the adjudication of specific
cases or controversies. Their duty is often the same: to render impartial decisions. . . . They
face the same risk of constant unfounded suits by those disappointed by the parole board's deci-
sions."); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("the
function of the Parole Board is more nearly akin to that of a judge in imposing sentence and
granting or denying probation than it is to that of an executive administrator"), aft'd, 548 F.2d 354
(5th Cir. 1977); Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (court
characterized the parole board as the "arm of the sentencing judge").
65. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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Guidelines. The critical question is whether the Guidelines provide a
"scientific test or measuring stick" by which a parole board can make
mechanical individual parole decisions without any weighing of policy
considerations. 66
The Guidelines consist of two indices-the "offense severity" rat-
ing and the "salient factor score."' 67 The salient factor score is based on
objective criteria, all of which are fixed at the time of sentencing. 68 The
parole board does nothing more than compile the information and cal-
culate a score. The offense severity rating, on the other hand, is a sub-
jective evaluation, made by the parole examiner, of the severity of the
prisoner's past criminal record. The rating is subjective for several rea-
sons. First, the prisoner's past offenses do not always fall neatly into
one of the offenses described in the ratings.69 Therefore, the examiner
has some discretion as to how to categorize past behavior. Second, the
offense severity rating has no method for handling multiple instances of
the same crime and the examiner, again, has the authority to choose
whether to increase the severity rating.70 Third, the parole examiner
may take into account non-adjudicated facts, which may significantly
affect the ultimate score, when compiling the offense severity rating.7'
Fourth, the parole examiner is in the position of assessing the prisoner's
credibility, for the prisoner will often dispute facts on his record that
the parole examiner may or may not choose to believe.72 Finally, the
Guidelines provide for a range of years of recommended incarceration,
rather than a specific number of years.73 The parole examiner must
therefore determine how many years of incarceration within this range
to recommend. Hence, the Guidelines leave much room for the parole
examiner to make the policy judgments he is directed to make under
the parole statute.
66. See supra text accompanying note 37.
67. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1983).
68. This score is intended to predict the likelihood that the prisoner will remain on parole
without violating the law. The factors that comprise this rating are (1) the number of prior convic-
tions, (2) the number of prior incarcerations of more than 30 days, (3) age at commencement of
current offense, (4) recency of prior commitment, (5) whether parole had ever been revoked before
or the prisoner had committed a new offense while on parole or is a probation violator this time,
and (6) whether a history of heroin or opiate dependence exists. Id
69. The prisoner's past offenses do not always fall neatly into those offenses set forth in the
"Offense Severity Rating" because the Rating was compiled from the offenses contained in the
California Penal Code. As a result, many federal crimes are not listed. Project, supra note 56, at
823-24 & n.67.
70. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(d)(1983).
71. See Project, supra note 56, at 835, n.114.
72. See id at 836-37.
73. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b)(1983).
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In addition to the discretion exercised pursuant to the Guidelines,
the parole examiner makes policy judgments when he exercises the
power granted under the regulations to make a parole decision outside
the range of time calculated under the Guidelines.74 The Guidelines
allow such exceptions in order to be consistent with the reason for im-
plementing the Guidelines-to structure discretion without removing
individual considerations.7 5 A number of factors, such as unusually
good or bad behavior during incarceration,76 may justify a decision
outside the Guidelines. Consideration of this factor advances the pol-
icy objectives of rewarding prisoners who observe the rules of the insti-
tution, as well as protecting the public by keeping incarcerated those
prisoners who demonstrate no signs of rehabilitation. Additional rea-
sons for a decision outside the Guidelines include the presence of unu-
sual emotional or health problems of the prisoner, and aggravating and
mitigating circumstances surrounding the crime.77 Consideration of
these factors advances the policy objectives of maintaining family ties,
releasing prisoners who are capable of being productive members of
society, instilling respect for the law, and protecting the safety of the
public. Thus, in addition to the discretion exercised in compiling the
Guideline "score," a parole examiner exercises discretion each time he
makes a decision to recommend a length of incarceration within or
outside the range of time calculated under the Guidelines.
The parole decision, therefore, continues to require the exercise of
the type of discretion that involves the weighing of policy factors even
at the individual parole decision level. It is this fact, rather than-a stat-
utory description of the parole decision as "discretionary," that quali-
fies the parole decision as a discretionary function. 78 Furthermore, the
purposes and policies behind the FTCA and the discretionary function
74. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1983).
75. Id § 2.20(a). The number of decisions within the Guidelines ranged from approximately
88.4% to 91.7% from the period of October 1973 to March 1974. Project, supra note 56, at 825 n.75
(citing HoFFMAN & DEGOSTIN, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING: STRUCTURING DISCRETION 10
(1974)).
76. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1983).
77. Id
78. Furthermore, it is only when this thorough examination of the parole decision is com-
pleted that a satisfactory answer is found to the appellants' attempt to analogize the "negligent
release" cases to the parole decision. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Because the
parole statute no longer spells out the parole decision as "discretionary," the en bane court's dis-
tinction that physicians do not "[act] within the discretion granted ...by statute" no longer
suffices, if, indeed, it ever did. See Payton, 679 F.2d at 481. The better basis for distinguishing the
"negligent release" cases from the parole decision is that although the "negligent release" cases
involve the weighing of several conflicting factors, these factors are medically-based. They do not,
as in the case of a parole decision, involve the weighing of several conflicting policy factors. This
distinction has been recognized by several courts. See Underwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 92
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exception are best served by a finding that the parole decision is a non-
reviewable discretionary function. Because the court of appeals panel,
in finding that the parole decision was not a discretionary function,
based its opinion to a large extent on the FTCA's purposes and poli-
cies, its analysis will be examined in more detail below.
The court of appeals panel in Payton examined three purposes or
policies behind the FTCA. First, it held that a finding that the parole
decision was not a discretionary function best served the purpose of
spreading the cost of injury among taxpayers. 79 The court believed
that this purpose was especially important when the injury was as seri-
ous as it was in Payton. The court is correct that one purpose of the
FTCA was to spread the cost of injury among the taxpayers, 80 but Con-
gress, when it adopted the exception, recognized that this objective is
less important than the interest in preserving independent, uninhibited
decision-making when officials exercise a discretionary function. Thus,
when a discretionary function exists, it is immune from review, regard-
less of the degree or nature of injury that results. Indeed, protection
becomes more necessary as the potential injury from an official activity
becomes greater. If minimal injury is the most that can result from a
decision, decisionmakers will be less apt to be inhibited from acting
according to their best judgment, even if their actions are subject to
review. In fact, no court that has applied the discretionary function
exception has weighed the degree or nature of the loss to determine
whether the discretionary function exception should apply.8'
The other policy considerations that the Payton panel. addressed
are the ability of the judiciary to adjudicate attacks on the parole deci-
(5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
Finally, even if it is conceded, for the sake of argument, that the Guidelines, as the panel
believed, allow the parole examiner no room for discretion, the parole decision would still be
immune from judicial review. For then the parole examiner would simply plug the prisoner's
individual characteristics into a pre-established formula (the Guidelines) to determine the number
of years of required incarceration. This mechanical process of entering individual characteristics
into a pre-established formula is exactly what the Dalehite Court spoke of when it held that the
execution of planning level decisions "in accordance with official directions" was not actionable.
See supra note 28. To find such execution actionable under the "good samaritan" line of cases, it
would be necessary to show that the process had been performed negligently. This might occur,
for instance, if a parole examiner plugged an incorrect number into the Guidelines. Such negli-
gence was not alleged in Payton.
79. Payton, 636 F.2d at 144-45.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1942); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1942).
81. Indeed, in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the government's activities re-
sulted in far greater financial loss and bodily injury than in Payton, yet such loss and injury was
not a consideration in the Court's decision whether the discretionary function exception should
apply.
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sion and the ability of the Parole Board to continue to carry out its
function efficiently and effectively.82 The panel court's conclusion that
the judiciary is competent to review attacks on the parole decision, and
that such review would not keep parole examiners from carrying out
their function aggressively and efficiently, rested heavily on its charac-
terization of the parole decision since the implementation of the Guide-
lines as a largely "fixed and mechanical" process. 83 This char-
acterization is incorrect. The parole decision still entails the weighing
of policy factors and is, therefore, essentially a legislative process. 84
Such legislative decisions do not easily lend themselves to an assess-
ment of "fault" because the court has no objective standard against
which to judge the decision; the decisions are, therefore, not proper
subjects of review.85
The threat of judicial review would probably also make parole ex-
aminers excessively cautious in their parole decisions. Parole decisions
adversely affect a large number of individuals, each a potential source
of litigation.86 The possibility that the government may be liable for
significant damages because of a parole board's actions, or at the very
least that it would spend significant amounts of money defending a pa-
role board's actions, would inhibit parole examiners from acting as ag-
gressively as they have in the past. Many prisoners capable of leading
lawful, productive lives would remain in prison-a result never in-
tended by Congress.
Finally, the constant review of parole decisions would significantly
diminish the efficiency of the current parole system. The number of
hearing examiners is already substantially below the number needed to
conduct thorough reviews of the prisoners eligible for parole.87 Re-
quiring hearing examiners and parole board members to appear in
82. Payton, 636 F.2d at 144, 145.
83. Id at 146. The panel also buttressed its opinion by noting that the parole decision was
made by "low level" officials. Id This method of determining whether an activity is discretionary
has been universally rejected. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
85. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 829 (citing K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 153 (1951)).
86. See Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981).
87. See Project, supra note 56, at 821 n.49 (noting that in 1970 there were eight board mem-
bers and eight hearing examiners to conduct 12,000 hearings and review 5,000 progress reports);
see also Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981);
Payton, 679 F.2d at 493 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring parole officials to testify in
court as to their decisions would "[threaten] substantial damage to our correctional system" and
noting that in a twelve-month period ending June 30, 1981, 6,452 persons began a term of parole);
H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 351,
353 (Congress recognized of the "burgeoning caseload" of the Parole Board).
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court and defend their actions would cripple an already overburdened
process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The government, like private citizens, should generally be ac-
countable for its actions, and immunity from judicial review should not
be lightly granted. But certain decisions make judicial review at its
worst, little more than a guessing game, and at its best, a second opin-
ion. Such decisions involve the weighing of social, financial, economic
and political factors. The parole decision, before the implementation
of the Guidelines, was such a decision and it remains a highly discre-
tionary decision today. The Guidelines, enacted with the intention of
"guiding" the parole decision, do not perform the process that is the
essence of every discretionary function-the weighing of policy factors.
This weighing is still performed by the parole examiner, both when
applying the Guidelines and when deciding whether a decision should
be made outside the time range permissible under the Guidelines.
Therefore, the parole decision falls within the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA and should not be subject to judicial scrutiny.
Julie Hills
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